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and
unresponsive, s° to the public which they are to
serve.perhaps

VI.

CONCLUSION

A court can no more dictate what a privately owned newspaper can print than it can dictate what it cannot print.8 2 No
right of access exists for an advertiser who desires to have a
paid advertisement placed in a newspaper. While the courts
have been somewhat more willing to provide a right of access
to the broadcast media, this right has been subject to
erosion.8s
Furthermore, a newspaper's obligation to provide a means
for the dissemination of public information is not sufficient to
elevate it to the status of a quasi-public institution. Finally,
newspapers have received the benefit of exceptions to antitrust laws which have allowed them to establish a monopoly
position, making it difficult for an advertiser whose ad has
been rejected to seek judicial relief. The court decisions have
failed to eliminate the ironic inconsistency in our constitutional law that allows newspapers actually to restrict the dissemination of ideas under the aegis of freedom of the press.
DONALD W. LAYDEN, JR.

CIVIL PROCEDURE-Jurisdiction-State May Not
Assert Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Over An Insurance
Company's Contractual Obligations to Defend and
Indemnify Its Insured. Rush v. Savchuh, 444 U.S. 320
434 U.S.. 965 (1977).
80. B. BAGDIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHNES 127 (1971). The author notes:
Local monopoly in printed news raises serious questions of diversity of information and opinion. What a local newspaper does not print about local affair
[sic] does not see general print at all. And, having the power to take initiative
in reporting and enunciation of opinions, it has extraordinary power to set the
atmosphere and determine the terms of local consideration of public issues.
81. It is questionable given the newspaper's commitment to its status as a private
corporation whether it is responsive to the public in general or only that public with
adequate resources to obtain access. See Barnet & Muller, Global Reach 230 (1974).
82. 92 Wis. 2d at 713, 285 N.W.2d at 894.
83. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
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(1980). The United States Supreme Court, in Rush v.
Savchuk,1 recently laid to rest one of the last jurisdictional
remnants of Pennoyer v. Nefp by holding that a state could
not assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over an insurance company's contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured. This ingenious method for obtaining jurisdiction was
first employed in the New York case of Seider v. Roth8 and
was found useful in those cases where personal jurisdiction
could not be obtained over the insured. In Rush, the procedure was held to be unconstitutional because it violated the
due process, minimum contacts test created in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington4 and extended in Shaffer v. Heitner5
to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Rush decision,
however, not only ended the indirect exercise of jurisdiction
permitted in Seider, it also called into question the analysis
used to determine the constitutionality of direct action statutes. Before Rush and its potential impact on direct action
law can be understood, the historical development of this procedure must be reviewed.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. JurisdictionFrom Pennoyer to International Shoe
In the century-old case of Pennoyer v. Neff, the United
States Supreme Court limited state courts' jurisdiction to
those persons or properties which were physically located
within the territorial boundaries of the state.6 The Court also
distinguished between the assertion of jurisdiction over a person and jurisdiction over property.7 Jurisdiction over a person,
1. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
3. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
6. 95 U.S. at 715. This decision was based on:
two well established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an
independent State over persons and property ....
One of these principles of
public law is, that every State possesses the exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory .... The other principle
of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, that no State
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without
its territory.
Id. at 722.
7. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 196-202. See generally Hazard, A General The-
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labeled "in personam" jurisdiction, imposed personal liability
upon a defendant for the full amount of any judgment, but
was sometimes difficult to obtain because a defendant could
easily avoid service of process by simply leaving, or never entering, the forum state.8 Jurisdiction over property, denominated "in rem" or "quasi in rem" jurisdiction," was usually
easier to obtain because property was more difficult to move.
In rem jurisdiction, however, imposed liability only to the extent of the value of the property interest found in the forum
10
state.
Shortly after the formulation of these rigid rules, the Supreme Court began a long process of expanding the narrow
scope of the Pennoyer decision. The Court slowly recognized
that the nation's entrance into the modern, highly mobile
twentieth century required more flexible jurisdictional standards.1 At first, the Court faithfully followed Pennoyer and
chose to remedy any inadequacies through the creation of
legal fictions. 12 For example, a corporation doing business in a
state was deemed to be "present" in that state in order to
subject it to jurisdiction under Pennoyer's territorial limitations."8 Similarly, in Harris v. Balk,14 the Court assigned a situs to intangible property so that a state could determine if

ory of State-Court Jurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241.
8. 433 U.S. at 199.
9. A proceeding in rem determines the rights of all persons in the property. It is

an action against the property itself. A quasi in rem proceeding deals with the state,
ownership, or liability of particular persons as these relate to the property. A judg-

ment affects not only title to the property but also the rights in it possessed by particular individuals. Seider would seem to be a quasi in rem proceeding, but courts
often interchange these two terms. See 1 Am. JUR. 2d Actions §§ 40-41 (1963).
10. 433 U.S. at 199.
11. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the
In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. Rav. 569 (1958); Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REV. 909 (1960); Hazard, A
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241.
12. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 202-03.
13. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). Also, the advent

of automobiles and the expansion of national mobility created a special problem
which was handled by allowing the states to require every out-of-state motorist to
appoint a designated state official as his agent to accept legal process. By using a
state's roads, an out-of-state motorist "consented" to this requirement and Pennoyer's in-state service requirement was satisfied. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927).
14. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
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the property was located within its territorial limits and was
thus subject to its jurisdiction. 15 The Court in Harris held
that the situs of a debt accompanied the debtor, and the debt
could therefore be garnished and subjected to a forum's jurisdiction wherever the debtor could be found. 6
Finally, however, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,17 the Court rejected these fictions as they had been applied to in personam jurisdiction and formulated the following
standard for determining jurisdiction:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
5
justice."'
The method for determining whether sufficient minimum contacts existed was not to involve a mechanical test; rather, the
nature and quality of the defendant's acts were to be viewed
in relation to the forum's interests in the administration of its
laws.1 9 Therefore, Pennoyer's emphasis on the mutually exclusive sovereignty of each state over its own territory gave way
to InternationalShoe's emphasis on "the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. ' 20 The new standard announced in InternationalShoe, however, applied only
to in personam jurisdiction. Thus, the Pennoyer decision and
the legal fictions resulting therefrom remained and continued
to grow in the areas of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.2
15. Id. at 225.
16. In Harris,one Epstein, a resident of Maryland, attached a $180 debt owed by
Harris to Balk when Harris, a resident of North Carolina, happened to enter Mary-

land to conduct business. Epstein asserted that Balk owed him $300 and thus caused
a writ of attachment to be personally served on Harris claiming the $180 owed to

Balk. Judgment was later entered in Epstein's favor and Harris paid the $180 debt.
At the same time, however, Balk commenced an action against Harris in North Carolina to recover the $180. In response, Harris pleaded the Maryland judgment as a bar
to recovery. The Supreme Court concluded that the obligation of the debtor accompanies him wherever he goes so the attachment of the $180 debt and the judgment by
the Maryland court were valid and entitled to full faith and credit.
17. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
18. Id. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
19. Id. at 319.
20. 433 U.S. at 204.
21. See generally Zammit, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconsti-
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B. The Legacy of Seider v. Roth
One of the most ingenious legal fictions to arise out of the
efforts to deal with the inadequacies of Pennoyer appeared in
the New York case of Seider v. Roth.22 In Seider, the plaintiffs, residents of New York, were injured in an automobile
accident in Vermont, allegedly caused by the negligence of the
defendant, a Canadian resident.23 Unable to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff commenced suit
in New York by attaching the contractual obligations of the
defendant's automobile insurer to defend and indemnify its
insured.24 Although the automobile insurance carrier was doing business in New York, the policy had been issued in Canada where the defendant resided. 5
The New York court found that the obligations embodied
in the insurance policy could be considered a "debt.12

Fur-

ther, because the situs of a debt accompanies the debtor
under the rule announced in Harris v. Balk,27 the debt was
subject to garnishment wherever the debtor could be found. 28
Consequently, insofar as the defendant's insurance carrier was
doing business and was therefore present in New York, the
situs of the debt was in New York, and the New York courts
could properly exercise
jurisdiction over the debt res without
29
offending due process.

tutional?,49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 668 (1975).
22. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
23. Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100. Roth, the other defendant,
was a driver of a third car involved in the accident.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The court based this decision on Matter of Riggle's Estate, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416
(1962). According to the dissent, 17 N.Y.2d at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 315-16, 269

N.Y.S.2d at 103-04, Riggle does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited.
Riggle involved an accident similar to Seider's, but the defendant had been personally served in New York and was thus subjected to in personam jurisdiction. The
obligation to defend had accrued and the insurance company was actually defending
the case when the defendant died. Due to the death, the action could not be continued in personam, so the court determined that the obligations contained in the insurance contract constituted a debt, thus conferring quasi in rem jurisdiction to the New
York court.
27. 198 U.S. 215, 227 (1905).

28. 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
29. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. The court did not deal with
the problem that under this analysis the situs of the debt res might be found in every
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A year later in Simpson v. Loehman,3 ° the New York
court, faced with a due process challenge to an assertion of
jurisdiction based upon the garnishment of an insurer's obligation, 1 responded by simply reiterating the Seider rationale
and by citing Harrisv. Balk. 2 The court also helped to solidify the Seider case by noting what it considered to be a trend
toward the relaxation of jurisdictional requirements and by
explaining the policies underlying such broad exercises of
jurisdiction:
The historical limitations on both in personam and in
rem jurisdiction, with their rigid tests, are giving way to a
more realistic and reasonable evaluation of the respective
rights of the plaintiffs, defendants and the State in terms of
fairness. Such an evaluation requires a practical appraisal of
the situation of the various parties rather than an emphasis
on somewhat magical and medieval concepts of presence and
power. Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as the
present is in full control of the litigation; it selects the defendant's attorneys; it decides if and when to settle; and it
makes all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation. Moreover, where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum
state and the insurer is present in and regulated by it, the
State has a substantial and continuing relation with the controversy. For jurisdictional purposes, in assessing fairness
under the due process clause and in determining
the public
33
policy of New York, such factors loom large.
state where the insurance company was doing business. Also, the debt might be found
in several states at once.
30. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
31. In Simpson, there were three constitutional contentions made: (1) that the
attachment offends due process; (2) that it imposes an undue burden on interstate
commerce in the field of insurance; and (3) that it impairs the obligations of the
insurance contract. The last two contentions were summarily dismissed as having no
merit and were treated in a footnote. 21 N.Y.2d at 309 n.2, 234 N.E.2d at 670 n.2, 287
N.Y.S.2d at 635 n.2.
32. [W]e perceive no denial of due process since the presence of that debt in
this State (see, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 supra)-contingent or inchoate though it may be-represents sufficient of a property right in the defendant to furnish the nexus with, and the interest in, New York to empower its
courts to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over him.
21 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (parallel citations omitted).
33. Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (citations omitted). One of
the cases cited for support, along with InternationalShoe, see notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra, was McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957). McGee involved a situation in which personal jurisdiction over a foreign in-
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Thus, in the name of realism, New York adopted what became known as the Seider doctrine.
The Seider case was strongly criticized and repeatedly
challenged in the courts of New York. As a result, two major
lines of argument developed. The first focused upon Seider's
reliance on Harris v. Balk and the characterization of the insurance policy obligations as a debt. The second area of criticism centered around the case of Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,"4 and the constitutionality of creating a
state direct action statute to cover Seider-type situations.
The first line of argument, originally articulated by Judge
surance company was based upon an isolated insurance contract delivered to the
plaintiff in California. McGee is generally considered one of the Supreme Court's
most liberal applications of InternationalShoe's "minimum contacts" test. Note,
however, that the Simpson court did not cite Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
decided the same year as McGee. In Hanson, a Florida court asserted jurisdiction
over a trustee, located in Delaware, under a trust agreement executed in Delaware by
a Pennsylvania resident who later moved her residence to Florida. Id. at 238-39. Although most of the beneficiaries and the executor resided in Florida, the Delaware
courts refused to uphold the Florida court's judgment. The Supreme Court in Hanson upheld the Delaware court and in response to McGee's broad interpretation of
due process, the Court said:
In McGee the Court noted the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents. As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transportation
has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer... to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe .... But it is a mistake to assume that this trend
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts ....
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the
"minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of
jurisdiction over him.
Id. at 250-51. In addition, the Court in Hanson specifically discussed in rem jurisdiction and pointed out that, while tangible property posed no problem in applying Pennoyer's rule that property had to be within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum
state, the situs of intangibles posed quite a different problem. Id. at 246-47.
Hanson was subsequently deemed a freak by most lower courts and limited to its
facts. For example, Professor Foster, in his Revision Notes to Wisconsin's long-arm
statute, § 801.05, stated that Hanson's language was "probably too sweeping". Foster,
Long Arm Jurisdictionin FederalCourts, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 9, 33. See Zerbel v. H.L.
Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 61-62, 179 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1970). See also Kurland,
The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdictionof
State Courts; From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 569 (1958);
Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARv. L. Rv. 695 (1959).
34. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
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Burke in his Seider dissent 5 and reiterated in his dissenting
opinion in Simpson v. Loehmann,5 strongly attacked the majority's characterization of the policy obligations as a "debt."
The contractual promise to defend was contingent upon a suit
being commenced while the promise to indemnify was contingent upon an award of damages.3 7 Thus, these "contingent"
promises did not fall within New York's statutory definition
of an attachable debt,38 nor did they constitute an "ordinary"
debt, such as that present in the Harris case.3 9
35. Judge Burke also pointed out the circularity of the majority's logic. If the accrual of the obligations to defend and indemnify is contingent upon the valid commencement of suit, then the jurisdiction needed to validly commence the suit cannot
be based upon the insurance policy obligations which do not accrue until after valid
commencement. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
36. 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 642. Judge Burke was
joined by Judge Scileppi. Also, Judge Breitel, who was joined by Judge Bergan, noted
in a separate concurring opinion that only the principles of stare decisis and the need
for institutional stability influenced his decision to follow Seider. He went on to agree
with the dissent and to attack the theoretical unsoundness of the case. Id. at 314-16,
234 N.E.2d at 674-75, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 240-42.
37. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. The policy promised to defend only if a suit was commenced and to indemnify only if damages were
awarded against the insured. However, the court did not specify which obligation
constituted the garnished res. It would seem, however, that the duty to defend would
provide no recoverable damages and the duty to indemnify would not arise until after
the duty to defend had been completely exercised and an unfavorable court decision
entered against Lemiux. See Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation,67 COLUM. L. Rv. 550 (1967).
38. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
§ 5201 Subd. (a) defines an attachable debt as one which "is past due or which is yet
to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor." The dissent also
quoted from Herrmann & Grace v. City of New York, 130 App. Div. 531, 535, 114
N.Y.S. 1107, 1110 (1909), aff'd 199 N.Y. 600, 93 N.E. 376, 123 N.Y.S. 1120 (1910), "It
is well settled that an indebtedness is not attachable unless it is absolutely payable at
present, or in the future and not dependable upon contingency." For further discussion of New York law prior to Seider, see Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles:
Contingent Obligationsand the Interstate Corporation,67 COLum. L. Rv. 550, 553
(1967).
39. 21 N.Y.2d at 320, 234 N.E.2d at 677, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 645. In Harris,the Court
said, "We speak of ordinary debts, such as the one in this case." 198 U.S. at 223.
In his dissent in Simpson, Judge Burke also foresaw the new approach to in rem
jurisdiction which the Supreme Court would later take in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977), and in Rush. Judge Burke noted that due process may bar assigning a
situs to intangibles as had been done under Harrisand that Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958), may have even undercut Harris altogether. 21 N.Y.2d at 320, 234
N.E.2d at 678, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 645. (For a further discussion of Hanson, see note 33
supra).
Judge Burke suggested that the minimum contacts test created in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), be applied not only to in personam
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This same issue was considered a short time later in
Podoisky v. Devinney.40 There, the federal district court held
the Seider doctrine to be unconstitutional, distinguishing the
"ordinary" debt found in Harrisfrom the complex insurance
contract obligations reviewed in Seider."I Most importantly,
however, the court noted that the debt in Harris was of a
fixed amount, while the amount of "debt" in Seider could not
be determined until a judgment had been rendered against
the insured.42 This fact created a dilemma for an insured. He
could not defend his property without personally appearing in
the action. Yet, if he were to appear, he would subject himself
to the court's jurisdiction and to the possibility of a judgment
in excess of his insurance policy limits. Consequently, in a
negligence action where the damages might exceed the policy
limits, no knowledgeable insured would subject himself to personal jurisdiction. 4 The insurer, in turn, could not appear and
litigate its interests in the negligence action since it was not a
party defendant. 44 Instead, it would be forced to allow a default judgment to be entered against its insured, and thereafter would be subject to a suit by the plaintiff for satisfaction
of the judgment to the extent of the policy limits. By this
time, however, the issues concerning liability and damages
would already have been settled by default and could not be
jurisdiction but also to in rem jurisdiction.
The assigning of situs to intangibles is, as we all know, but a legal fiction and
while justice or convenience may on occasion require such an assignment of
situs to intangibles, considerations of the purpose for which such an assign-

ment of situs is necessary and fairness to those claiming an interest in the
subject property ought to govern the selection process.

21 N.Y.2d at 321, 234 N.E.2d at 676, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 646 (footnotes omitted).
40. 281 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See Comment, Podolsky v. Devinney and
the Garnishment of Intangibles: A Chip Off the Old Balk, 54 VA. L. Rav. 1426
(1968).
41. 281 F. Supp. at 494.
42. Id. at 497. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, aff'd on rehearing,410
F.2d 117, 121 (1969) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
43. 281 F. Supp. at 498. It would seem to be the insurer's obligation to inform the
insured of this possibility. Also, any unauthorized appearance by the insurer on the

insured's behalf would be null. Id. at 499. See generally Note, The Insurer's Duty to
Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 734 (1966).
44. This problem did not exist in Rush because of MINN. STAT. § 571.51, which
allows a plaintiff to file a supplemental complaint making the garnishee (insurance
company) a party to the action in the event the garnishee denies liability.
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relitigated.45
Scarcely more than a month after the Podolsky decision
was handed down, the New York court, in a per curiam opinion, responded to the seemingly deadly blow struck by Podolsky.48 In denying a motion for reargument in the Simpson
case, the court noted that neither Seider nor Simpson had
purported to expand the basis for in personam jurisdiction;
any recovery was necessarily limited to the value of the asset
attached, namely the liability insurance policy. This meant
that "there may not be any recovery against the defendant in
this sort of case in an amount greater than the face value of
such insurance policy47 even though he proceeds with the defense on the merits.

This statement, however, did not lay this line of argument
to rest. In Minichiello v. Rosenberg,48 the appellant raised the
possibility of a New York judgment collaterally estopping a
defendant from relitigating these issues in a suit for any unpaid balance in another state where personal jurisdiction had
been acquired. 49 The court handled this new twist by assuring

the appellant that it did not think another state would permit
such a thing and by comforting the appellant with his right to
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.50
45. 281 F. Supp. at 499. The only possible defense open to the insurer is the insured's failure to cooperate. However, insofar as the insurer was obligated to explain
to the insured the possible consequences of defending the suit, it is unlikely that a
court would then allow the insurer to claim noncooperation when the insured made
the most intelligent decision given the insurer's advice. But see Barker v. Smith, 290
F. Supp. 709, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's
Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, 658 (1967).
46. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S. 2d 633,
motion for rehearing denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1968).
47. Id. at 990-91, 238 N.E.2d at 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16. Professor Siegel has
termed this "a miraculous per curiam opinion." N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5201, Commentary at 15 (McKinney Supp. 1968), cited in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d
106, 111 (2d Cir. 1968). Such a finding cannot be supported by New York law.
48. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
49. Id. at 111-12.
50. Id. at 112. The court also mentioned other problems which might arise. One is
created by the New York law which requires parties to appear in New York for the
taking of their depositions. Id. A second problem is created by placing the defendant
in a position where he can assert a counterclaim only at the expense of subjecting
himself to liability above the policy limits. Id. at 112-13. A third problem, raised by
Judge Anderson, dissenting from the en banc rehearing decision, is that a Seider debt
may exist in several states at once because a corporation may be doing business in
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The second line of argument grew out of Judge Keating's
separate concurring opinion in Simpson." Judge Keating relied on the United States Supreme Court case of Watson v.
Employer's Liability Assurance Corporation52 to support the
Seider doctrine. In Watson, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of applying Louisiana's direct action statute53 to an
insurance contract which contained a "no action" clause" expressly forbidding such direct actions.5 5 The defendant argued
that, although the accident occurred in Louisiana, the contract had been executed outside of Louisiana and therefore
Louisiana could not disregard the "no action" clause without
violating due process.5 The Court found, however, that such a
statute did not violate due process because Louisiana had a
legitimate interest in the people who were injured in Louisiana and in the insurance covering such people.57 The Court
stated:

many states at the same time. In Harris,the debtor/garnishee could only be present
in one state at a time. Id. at 121. Cf. Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Conn. 1979)
(insurer may be subjected to double liability in paying for the defense and in paying
plaintiff's damages). But see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). Justice Powell, dissenting, noted the possibility of
a second trial without the benefit of lawyers supplied by the insurance company and
without old witnesses or with new evidence.
51. 21 N.Y.2d at 312, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
52. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
53. The applicable part of Louisiana's direct action statute reads as follows:
The injured person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of
direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy in
the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said action may be brought
against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the insurer, jointly
and in solido. This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the state of Louisiana or not and
whether or not such policy contains a provision for permitting such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana
It is the intent of this section that any action brought hereunder shall be
subject to all the lawful conditions of the policy or contract and the defenses
which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured,
provided the terms and the conditions of such policy or contract are not in
violation of the laws of this state.
Id. at 68, n.4 quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1950).
54. "No action" clauses prohibit direct actions against the insurer until after a
final determination of the insured's liability.
55. 348 U.S. at 67-69.
56. Id. at 70. It was conceded that Louisiana had the right to ignore "no action"
clauses made within its own state.
57. Id. at 72.
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Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs beyond her boundaries which are no concern
of hers. Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most
likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana
may have to care for them. Serious injuries may require
treatment in Louisiana homes or hospitals by Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute. They may be compelled
to call upon friends, relatives, or the public for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural interests in the injured by
providing remedies for recovery of damages. It has a similar
interest in policies of insurance which are designed to assure
ultimate payment of such damages. Moreover, Louisiana
courts in most instances provide the most convenient forum
for trial of these cases ....
What has been said is enough
to show Louisiana's legitimate interest in safeguarding the
rights of persons injured there. In view of that interest, the
direct action provisions here challenged do not violate due
process.58
In Judge Keating's view, the Watson decision turned on
Louisiana's legitimate governmental interest in protecting the
rights of injured persons rather than on the mere fact that
Louisiana was the site of the accident.5 9 A similar interest,
reasoned Judge Keating, might exist in a forum where the accident did not occur, but where the plaintiff was a resident
and the defendant's insurer-the truly interested party-was
doing business. Thus, Judge Keating viewed Seider-type actions as judicially created direct actions against insurers.6 0
In response to this argument, Judge Burke noted that
Seider required only that the insurer be present in the forum.
This requirement, by itself, was insufficient to establish the
necessary state interest under Watson. 1 Judge Burke observed that the language used in Watson clearly stressed the

fact that the accident occurred within the forum.2 This fact
rendered the exercise of direct action jurisdiction permissible.
In Minichiello, the court again considered the effects of
Watson upon the Seider doctrine.6 3 The court found that al58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 72-73.
21 N.Y.2d at 313, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
Id.
Id. at 318-19, 234 N.E.2d at 676, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.
Id. at 319, 234 N.E.2d at 677, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
410 F.2d at 109. See generally Minichiello v. Rosenberg- Garnishment of
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though Louisiana's direct action statute applied only to accidents or injuries occurring in Louisiana, e 4 the same considerations advanced to sustain the direct action statute in Watson
would apply with equal force to a statute permitting direct
actions against insurers by residents of a forum irrespective of
where the accident occurred. 5 In other words, a state has a
legitimate interest in protecting not only the rights of persons
injured in the state, but also the rights of its residents wherever they are injured. 6
The dissenting opinion in Minichiello criticized the majority for reading Watson as an exhaustive treatment of all relevant due process considerations, rather than as a limited list
of pertinent Louisiana interests.6 7 It also noted that every

Intangibles-In Search of a Rationale, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 407 (1969).
64. 410 F.2d at 69. See note 53 supra.
65. Id. at 110. The majority broke Watson into three considerations and found:
The first set of considerations marshalled by Mr. Justice Black in favor of its
validity,... would relate with equal force to one on behalf of residents. He
stressed that "persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them. Serious
injuries may require treatment in Louisiana homes or hospitals by Louisiana
doctors. The injured may be destitute. They may be compelled to call upon
friends, relatives or the public for help." On the other hand, his next argument,
that "'Louisiana courts in most instances provide the most convenient forum
for trial of these cases," by its very terms could not apply. While the place of
plaintiff's residence may be a convenient forum for the trial of an action arising from an out-of-state accident in that not only he but much of the evidence
of the damages may be there, it will rarely be "the most convenient" one since
the other witnesses to the accident are elsewhere-probably far away. But the
Justice's final consideration-the plaintiff's difficulty in bringing the defendant
before the forum-applies with even greater force to the state of plaintiff's
residence than to that of injury in light of the development of long-arm statutes that will generally allow the state of injury to obtain personal jurisdiction
of the insured and so avoid the need for a direct action against the insurer.
Id. at 109-10.
66. Id. at 110. In support of its analysis, the court also noted the new realistic
approach to determining jurisdiction which the Simpson majority had emphasized.
See note 33 and accompanying text, supra. The Minichiello court said,
While the burden on the insurer in trying a case in a state other than the locus
of the accident is heavier, there has been, as we have recently noted, "'a movement away from the bias favoring the defendant,' in matters of personal jurisdiction 'toward permitting the plaintiff to insist that the defendant come to
him' when there is a sufficient basis for doing so."
Id. at 110, quoting Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1967),
which in turn was quoting Von Mehran & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1128 (1966).
67. 410 F.2d at 114. The dissent chided the majority for believing that Louisiana
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plaintiff was simply not entitled to a legal remedy in the
forum most convenient to himself."' Watson and Louisiana's
direct action statute were fair only because the nonresident
defendant, by driving into Louisiana, voluntarily brought
himself within the jurisdiction of Louisiana. 9
These two independent lines of argument thus-developed
in response to Seider. However, a conflict between these two
separate criticisms soon surfaced. In Donawitz v. Danek,7 0 the
New York court was asked to extend the Seider doctrine to
situations involving nonresident plaintiffs.7 1 Clearly, if the
Seider doctrine was to continue to be characterized as a judicially created direct action, it could not be expanded to situations where the plaintiff was not a resident of the forum. 2 In
this regard, the second line of argument required that either
the accident or the plaintiff's residence be located in the forum in order to provide the forum with a legitimate interest
to invoke its jurisdiction. Conversely, if the insurance policy
obligations were to continue to be viewed as a garnishable
debt, then any person, regardless of residency, ought to be
permitted to garnish the debt.7 8 Indeed, precluding nonresidents from using the same legal processes afforded residents
could be viewed as violating the equal protection clause of the

would have a similar interest in protecting its medical creditors and its public funds
if the accident did not occur there. The dissent said, "this might be true if the plaintiff is hardy enough to reach Louisiana before requiring medical aid or public assistance; otherwise, the state where the accident occurred would be required to pick up
the tab." Id. at 114. Contra, Holzager v. Valley Hospital, 428 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
68. 410 F.2d at 115.
69. Id.
70. 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 297 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
71. Donowitz involved a nonresident plaintiff suing both a resident defendant and
a nonresident defendant for separate acts of medical malpractice. The original accident occurred in Pennsylvania and the nonresident doctor's acts occurred in New
Jersey.
72. 42 N.Y.2d at 142, 366 N.E.2d at 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
73. Id. at 143-44, 366 N.E.2d at 256-57, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 596. Harris v. Balk had
supported such a rule.
If there be a law of the state providing for the attachment of the debt, then, if
the garnishee be found in that state, and process be personally served upon
him therein, we think the court therefore acquires jurisdiction over him, and
can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff, and condemn
it, provided the garnishee could himself be sued by his creditor in that state.
198 U.S. at 222. See also 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 20 (1943); 6 AM. JuR. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 62 (1963).
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fourteenth amendment"' as well as the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution.75
Despite this conflict, the court in Donawitz upheld Seider
on the grounds of stare decisis and of legislative failure to
change the Seider doctrine.7 6 However, the court, with little
or no explanation,
refused to extend the doctrine to
7
nonresidents.

C. Shaffer v. Heitner
Shortly after Donawitz was decided, the United States Supreme Court decided Shaffer v. Heitner.7 1 In Shaffer the

Court extended the due process, minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. 9 In
so doing, the Court held that in order to exercise in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a thing, there must also exist a
legitimate basis for exercising jurisdiction over the interests of
persons in that thing.80 The standard for determining whether
such a legitimate basis exists is InternationalShoe's due process, minimum contacts standard.
The decision in Shaffer ended reliance upon Pennoyer and
its single determinative emphasis upon the location of the
74. 42 N.Y.2d at 142, 366 N.E.2d at 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
75. The U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 reads as follows: "The Citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." See
Harris v. Balk where the Court said:
There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the State of North Carolina, had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to recover the debt which Harris
owed him. Being a citizen of North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, one of which is the right
to institute actions in the courts of another state.
198 U.S. at 223.
76. 42 N.Y.2d at 142, 366 N.E.2d at 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
77. Federal courts had previously hinted at the unconstitutionality of extending
Seider to nonresidents. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, aff'd on rehearing,
410 F.2d 117, 119 (1969) (Hayes, J., concurring); Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, 411
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969); Varady v. Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
78. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Heitner commenced a shareholder's derivative suit in
Delaware against two corporations and their officers and directors. Heitner and all
the natural person defendants were nonresidents of Delaware whose only contact with
Delaware was the ownership of stock in the defendant Delaware corporations. To obtain jurisdiction in Delaware over these individual defendants, Heitner sequestered
their stock, which had a Delaware situs per statute, and thus asserted quasi in rem
jurisdiction. Id. at 189-95.
79. Id. at 207-12.
80. Id. at 207.
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property.8 1 The presence of property in the forum instead became just one contact to consider in determining jurisdiction.
For a state to exercise jurisdiction over property, it was now
necessary to review the contacts among the defendant, the fo-

rum, and the litigation, and not just the contacts between the
forum and the property. 2
The practical effect of the Shaffer decision was negligible
because in most in rem actions the property is sufficiently related to the litigation to satisfy the due process, minimum
contacts test. However, the Court noted, "[f]or the type of
quasi in rem action typified by Harris v. Balk... accepting
3
the proposed analysis would result in a significant change.M
In Harris the property was totally unrelated to the plaintiff's
claim and therefore the mere presence of the property in the
forum would not support the exercise of jurisdiction.8"
D. Confusion After Shaffer
Prior to Shaffer, the vast majority of states rejected the
Seider doctrine. 5 Only one other state, Minnesota, fully

81. See notes 6-16 and accompanying text, supra. One of the original reasons for
treating the presence of property as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction was to prevent
wrongdoers from avoiding payment of their obligations by simply leaving the state.
"This justification, however, does not explain why jurisdiction should be recognized
without regard to whether the property is present in the state because of an effort to
avoid the owner's obligations." Id. at 210. Also, the assumption that the debtor can
avoid payment by moving to another state is no longer valid in light of International
Shoe's broadening of personal jurisdiction. Id.
82. 433 U.S. at 208-09.
83. Id. at 208.
84. Id.
85. Tessier v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 1299 (1st Cir. 1972); Kirchman
v. Mikula, 443 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971) followed in Junt v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
345 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 1977); Robinson v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83
(3d Cir. 1970) followed in Jardine v. Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964);
Barber-Greene Co. v. Walco Nat. Corp., 428 F. Supp. 567 (D.DeL 1977); Sykes v.
Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Conn. 1975); Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt.
1970); Javorek v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728,
131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976)(overruling an earlier decision supporting Seider); Turner v.
Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973); State ex rel. Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J.
Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219 (1976); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499
P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1968); Housely v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah
2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1975).
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adopted Seider-type actions,88 while New Hampshire partially
adopted it, limiting its application to those situations where
the defendant also came from a state adopting Seider.8 7 Also,
most commentators had severely criticized Seider,8 while
only a few had lent it their support.8 9 Therefore, in view of
this abundance of criticism and in light of Shaffer, it might
have seemed that Seider was finally dead. New Hampshire
quickly drew this conclusion and found Seider overruled by
Shaffer9 0 However, in Minnesota, and especially in New
York, Shaffer only created more confusion.
Shortly after Shaffer was decided, several New York
courts held Seider to be overruled either on the ground that
Seider-type actions simply could not meet the requirements
of the due process, minimum contacts test,9 1 or on the ground
that Shaffer, in explicitly overruling Harris,92 had implicitly

86. Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973). See also Adkins v.
Northfield Foundry & Machine Co., 393 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Minn. 1974), where an
action was not found available to nonresident plaintiffs.
87. Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973). See also Robitaille v.
Orciuch, 382 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1974) where the court refused to extend Seider to
homeowner's insurance policies because an insurance company does not anticipate
out-of-state accidents to arise under such policies. Here the defendant was also from
a state not accepting the Seider doctrine. Ahern v. Hough, 116 N.H. 302, 358 A.2d
394 (1976) adopted a two-pronged test: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable from the standpoint of New Hampshire's interest in the litigation, and (2) it
must be consistent with the principles of fair play and substantial justice. Followed in
Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
88. See Reese, The Expanding Scope of JurisdictionOver Non-residents-New
York Goes Wild, 35 INs. COUNsEL L.J. 118 (1968); Stein, Jurisdictionby Attachment
of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1075 (1968); Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 668 (1975); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles:Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction In Rem and the
Attachment of Intangibles:Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725.
89. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 33
(1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 409 (1978). For a discussion of Shaffer's effect on Seider, see Shaffer
v. Heitner: New Constitutional Question Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 393 (1978); Bernstein, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient
Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?25 VULL. L. REv. 38 (1980).
90. Rocca v. Kenney, 117 N.H. 1057, 381 A.2d 330 (1977); Pono v. Brock, 408 A.2d
419 (N.H. 1979).
91. Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977); Attanasio v.
Ferre, 93 Misc. 2d 661, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1977); Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92
Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1977).
92. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text, supra.
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overruled Seider9 s After these first few cases, however, New
York changed course.""
In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corporation,the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit directly reviewed and refuted
the arguments made by the lower New York courts which had
declared Seider dead. 5 First, the court distinguished Harris
on the ground that Balk, the garnishee in Harris, was only
transitorily in the forum state whereas here the insurer was
regularly doing business in New York.9 6 Also, in Harris the
$180 debt could have been used for any purpose, whereas here
the only purpose for insurance was to protect the insured
from liability. Hence, "judgment for the plaintiff would not
deprive a defendant of anything substantial that would have
been otherwise useful to him. 9 7 Second, the court read Shaf-

fer to be a liberating opinion, not a restricting one: "The overriding teaching of Shaffer is that courts must look at realities
and not be led astray by fictions."98 The court thus returned
to the "realistic" approach adopted in Simpson v. Loehmann,
which recognized that the insurer controlled the defense."
This approach, along with the new trend toward making defendants come to the plaintiff, provided a sufficient basis for
93. Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1977); Torres v.
Towmotor Division of Caterpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
94. Two cases had been decided in favor of Seider despite Shaffer.Fish v. Bamby
Bakers, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (Seider still good law but the plaintiff
must be a resident of New York when the accident occurred); Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93
Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1978).
95. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally 52 TmE. L.Q. 366 (1979); 28 DRAKE
L. REv. 736 (1978-79); 12 AKRON L. RV. 331 (1978).
96. 579 F.2d at 198.
97. Id. at 199. This argument proves too much. The Court, in distinguishing the
Harris debt, brings into question Seider's holding that insurance policy obligations
can be labelled a "debt." Such an argument is interesting in light of the fact that
judges and commentators prior to Shaffer had attempted to overrule Seider on the
ground that the "ordinary debt" discussed in Harris'was distinguishable from that
represented by Seider. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text, supra.
98. 579 F.2d at 200.
99. Id. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text, supra, for discussion of Simpson.
See also Alford v. McGraw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1978), where the insurer's handling of the defense provided sufficient contacts under Shaffer. See also
Lee-Hy Paving Corp. v. O'Connor, 439 U.S. 1034, denying cert. to 579 F.2d 194
(1978), where Justice Powell, dissenting, noted that any reference to an insured as a
"nominal defendant" in the name of "reality" disregarded many of the true realities
which bear upon such defendants even though they have insurance. Id. at 1037-38.
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upholding Seider-type actions. 100
Shortly after O'Connor,the New York Court of Appeals in
Baden v. Staples'' upheld Seider upon similar grounds: "The
gist of the analysis is that the primary risks and burdens of
defending a Seider-type action rest on the insurer, who does
business in New York, and over whom even personal jurisdiction may, of course, be obtained."'' 2 Subsequently, the New
York courts fell into line in support of Seider.10
II. Rush v. Savchuk
A. Facts
Rush v. Savchuk involved a typical Seider factual situation. In January of 1972, Savchuk, an Indiana resident, was
injured in a single-car accident while riding as a passenger in
a car driven by Rush, also an Indiana resident. 04 The accident occurred in Indiana.1 5 The car was owned by Rush's father and insured by appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, under a policy issued in Indiana. 1 8
In June of 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota and on May 28,
1974, commenced suit against Rush in the state courts of
10 7
Minnesota by serving a garnishee summons on State Farm.
This summons treated State Farm's contract of insurance as
garnishable property, which, in turn, established quasi in rem
jurisdiction in Minnesota pursuant to Minnesota Statute §
571.41.10 8 In Indiana, Rush was given notice through service of
100. 579 F.2d at 200-01. The court also noted that none of the earlier anticipated
problems created by Seider had ever occurred. Id. at 202.
101. 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978).

102. Id. at 891, 383 N.E.2d at 111, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
103. Sanders v. Wiltemp Corp., 465 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Holzsager v.
Valley Hosp., 482 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Knapp v. Barron, 83 F.R.D. 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kalman v. Neuman, 71 A.D.2d 906, 420 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1979); Curran
v. Essex Island Marina, Inc., 70 A.D.2d 857, 418 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979); Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. v. Farber, 99 Misc. 2d 1001, 417 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1979); D'Agostino
v. Watt, 67 A.D.2d 762, 412 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1979); Erneta v. Princeton Hospital, 66

A.D.2d 669, 411 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1978).
104. Savchuk v. Rush, 309 Minn. 310, -,
245 N.W.2d 624, 626 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Savchuk 1].
105. Id.
106. Id. Rush was an additional insured under his father's State Farm insurance
policy.
107. Id.
108. The statute cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court, 309 Minn. 310, -,
245
N.W.2d 624, 627 n.1 (1976) contained the 1976 Amendments. The 1974 MINN. STAT.
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a copy of the summons, the complaint, and the garnishee
summons.109 The complaint alleged negligence and sought
$125,000 in damages. 110
In response, State Farm disclosed that nothing was due
and owing to Rush."' Savchuk then moved pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 571.51 for permission to file a supplemental
complaint naming State Farm as a party defendant."" Rush
and State Farm responded by moving to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over the defendant; Rush had no personal contacts with Minnesota that would support in personam jurisdiction and State Farm was an Illinois corporation that did
business in all fifty states.11 8 The trial court denied the mo-

tion to dismiss and granted the motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint.1

14

Rush and State Farm appealed.
B. Savchuk I

In. Savchuk I,

the

Minnesota

Supreme

Court was

§ 571.41 read as follows:
Subd. 2. Garnishment shall be permitted before judgment in the following
instances only:
(1) For the purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction
(a) when the defendant is a resident individual having departed from the
state with intent to defraud his creditors, or to avoid service, or keeps himself
concealed therein with like intent; or
(b) the defendant is a resident individual who has departed from the state,
or cannot be found therein; or
(c) the defendant is a non-resident individual, or a foreign corporation,
partnership or association.
(2) When the garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of suretyship, guarantee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee may be held to
respond to any person for the claim asserted against the debtor in the main
action.
109. Id. at -, 245 N.W.2d at 626.
110. Id. Savchuk had been barred from commencing a similar suit in Indiana by
the Indiana guest statute, INn. CODE §9-3-3-1. Also, this suit was filed after the twoyear Indiana statute of limitations had run. 311 Minn. 480, n.5, 272 N.W.2d 888,
891 n.5. Both of these Indiana laws presented conflict of laws questions including a
question as to whether Indiana's contributory negligence law or Minnesota's comparative negligence law would apply. Neither the Minnesota Supreme Court nor the U.S.
Supreme Court directly reviewed these issues. However, the Minnesota court hinted
that these conflict of laws questions would not bar recovery. Id.
111. 309 Minn. 310, - 245 N.W.2d 624, 626 (1976). Disclosure was made pursuant to the existing MINN. STAT. § 571.49.
112. 309 Minn. at -,
245 N.W.2d at 626.
113. Id. at -, 245 N.W.2d at 626.
114. Id. at
, 245 N.W.2d at 626-27.
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presented with two issues. 115 The first issue was similar to the
first line of argument developed in Seider.116 State Farm argued that its obligations to defend and indemnify were contingent and therefore were not properly garnishable under
Minnesota law.11 7 Minnesota, like New York, dismissed this
argument and stated that the Legislature's intent was "to
specify a limited number of situations in which garnishment
and quasi in rem jurisdiction would be available before judgment, regardless of whether the debt on which the garnishment was predicated was due absolutely." 1 s
The second issue focused upon the requirements of due
process: Assuming State Farm's policy obligations were garnishable under Minnesota law, did the Minnesota garnishment procedure conform to the constitutional requirements of
due process? 1 9 To answer this question, the court applied a
three-pronged test.
(1) Proper notice must be given to the defendant-insured,
115. Id. at , 245 N.W.2d at 627.
116. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text, supra.
117. 309 Minn. at - 245 N.W.2d at 627. This argument was based upon a conflict between MiNN. STAT. § 571.41(2) (note 108 supra), which outlines the situations
in which garnishment is permitted, and MmN. STAT. § 571.43(1), which defines who
may be garnished. MmN. STAT. § 571.43(1) reads as follows:
No person or corporation shall be adjudged a garnishee by reason of:
(1) Any money or other thing due to the judgment debtor, unless at the
time of the service of the summons the same is due absolutely, and without
depending on any contingency, ....
State Farm argued that its policy obligations were not "due absolutely" pursuant to
the statute.
118. 309 Minn. at ._, 245 N.W.2d at 627. The court supported its conclusion with
several reasons.
(1) Under § 571.41, the test was not whether the debt is due absolutely, but
whether the garnishee "may be held to respond" for the claim. Hence, insofar as
State Farm's potential liability was clearly established, § 571.41 applied. Id. at
245 N.W.2d at 627.
(2) The court perceived an irreconcilable conflict between the statutory provisions. Therefore, because § 571.41 was more recent in origin and more specific in
language, it was controlling over § 571.43. 309 Minn. at _ 245 N.W.2d at 627. This
rationale was based on MmN. STAT. § 645.26, which provides that, if a conflict exists
between 2 statutes which cannot be resolved so as to give effect to both, then the
most recent statute shall prevail. Id. at , 245 N.W.2d at 627.
(3) The court believed that § 571.41 gave effect to Minnesota's interest in providing a forum to its residents in its determination to extend its long-arm statute to the
maximum limits consistent with due process. Id. at , 245 N.W.2d at 628.
See also Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973).
119. 309 Minn. at , 245 N.W.2d at 627.
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affording him adequate opportunity to defend his property;
(2) the defendant cannot be exposed to liability greater than
the amount of his insurance policy; (3) the procedure
may
1 20
be utilized only by residents of the forum state.
Here, notice had been properly given and the plaintiff was
a resident at the commencement of the suit.1 21 The second requirement, however, caused a problem because it conflicted
with Rule 4.04(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 4.04(2) was similar to New York Rule 320 insofar as it
imposed personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the event
he chose to defend his attached property. 2 2 However, the
court simply held, as New York had in the rehearing of Simpson v. Loehman, 23 that Rule 4.04(2) would not apply to
Seider-type cases.' 24 Instead, recovery would be limited to the
face amount of the policy regardless of whether the defendant
chose to personally defend.' 2 5
In addition to this three-pronged test, the court noted that
while the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant
Rush would be improper, the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was justified on the grounds that the insurer controls the
defense, is present in the state, and is registered to do business and does business in the state.' 2 Also, the state had a
legitimate interest in providing a forum for its residents. 7
Finally, in response to the general criticism of Seider-type actions, the court concluded that modem convenient transportation made it easy for defendants to come long distances and

120. Id. at _, 245 N.W.2d at 628. See also Rintala v. Shoemaker, 262 F. Supp.
1044, 1054-56 (D. Minn. 1973).
121. The notice requirement (1) was established in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and adopted in Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F.
Supp. 1044, 1054 (D. Minn. 1973). The residency requirement (3) was discussed and
adopted in Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1055-56 (D. Minn. 1973), which,
in turn, adopted it from the per curiam opinion in the rehearing of Simpson v.
Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
122. Rule 4.04 states: "When quasi in rem jurisdiction has been obtained, a party
defending such action thereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court."
Minn. Stat. Ann. Rule 4.04 (West).
123. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 990-91, 238 N.E.2d 319, 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915-16 (1968).
124. 309 Minn. at,
245 N.W.2d at 628-29. See also Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362
F. Supp. at 1055.
125. 309 Minn. at -, 245 N.W.2d at 629.
126. Id. at -,
245 N.W.2d at 629.
127. Id.
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that any hardship arising out of potential second suits was no
more likely here than in other quasi in rem actions. 128
Thus, Savchuk I presented no new arguments in favor of
the Seider doctrine.12 9 The court primarily reiterated the arguments set forth in Rintala v. Shoemaker 80 which, in introducing the Seider doctrine to Minnesota, had relied upon the
arguments used by the New York courts."'
C.

Savchuk II

Savchuk I was decided in September of 1976. Three days
after its decision in Shaffer, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated
and remanded Savchuk I in light of Shaffer's new due process
requirements. 8 2 Thus, in Savchuk II, the Minnesota Supreme
Court was forced to leave the mechanical analysis it had employed in Savchuk I. It was asked to confront a more fundamental issue required under Shaffer: Did the defendant have
certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of a suit in Minnesota would not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice? The Minnesota
Court failed to address this question." 3
In Sauchuk II, the Minnesota Supreme Court briefly outlined the holding in Shaffer, noted the confusion it had
caused in New York, and distinguished it from Savchuk.11
The court found that the procedure employed to obtain quasi
in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer could be used in any kind of
suit, whereas the Minnesota garnishment procedure utilized

128. Id. at 245 N.W.2d at 630.
129. The dissent criticized the majority's adoption of a doctrine which had been
severely criticized and overwhelmingly rejected by other states. Id. at _ 245
N.W.2d at 631-32. In particular, the dissent pointed out that Savchuk was a resident
of Indiana when the accident occurred and only subsequently became a Minnesota
resident. To allow jurisdiction in such a situation, claimed the dissent, was clearly to
permit forum shopping. Id. at -,
245 N.W.2d at 633.
130. 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973).
131. Savchuk I was the first treatment by a state court in Minnesota of the Seider
doctrine. The doctrine had arisen tangentially once before in Holman v. General Ins.
Co. of America, 304 Minn. 312, 317 n.5, 231 N.W.2d 81, 84 n.5 (1975), but there, the
court declined to review it.
132. Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
133. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978) [hereinafter
referred to as Savchuk II].
134. Id. at 272 N.W.2d at 889-91.
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here could not. 3 5 Under Minnesota Statutes § 571.41, subdivision 2(2), the garnished insurance contract had to be related to the plaintiff's cause of action, and in this regard,
State Farm's policy had no real independent value or significance apart from such accident litigation.1 3 s The property sequestered in Shaffer, on the other hand, was totally unrelated
137
to the plaintiff's cause of action.
The court turned next to the "practical relationship between the insurer and the nominal defendant. ' "ss Seider-type
procedures, the court noted, protected the insured from liability beyond the policy limits and at the same time provided
anonymity for the insurer.'3 9 Also, the possible abuse of forum
shopping was minimized by limiting this procedure to residents, with the doctrine of forum non conveniens always
available to any overburdened defendant. 40 The court then
concluded with the following:
We view as relevant the relationship between the defending parties, the litigation, and the forum state. It cannot be
said that Minnesota lacks such minimally-requisite "contacts, ties or relations" to those defending parties as to of-

135. Id. at -, 272 N.W.2d at 891. Shaffer dealt with Delaware's general sequestration statute, DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 10, § 366 (1975). See note 108 supra for a copy of
Minnesota's garnishment statute.
136. 311 Minn. at -, 272 N.W.2d at 892. For support, the court cited O'Connor
v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978). See note 97 and accompanying
text, supra.
137. 311 Minn. at -, 272 N.W.2d at 892, quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 208-09 (1977). In Shaffer, the Court found that the directors of the defendant
corporation "simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware," for jurisdictional
purposes, despite the fact that the corporation had been incorporated under the laws
of Delaware. 433 U.S. 186, 216. Hence, it is questionable (at least in this author's
mind) whether the conclusion in Shaffer, that Delaware did not have jurisdiction to
sequester the stock of the defendants, logically follows from the legal reasoning used
by the Court. By voluntarily becoming directors of a corporation which had incorporated in Delaware specifically to take advantage of Delaware's liberal incorporation
laws, the defendants, in accordance with Hanson v. Denckla, had purposely availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum, and the defendant's property-stock in the defendant corporations-was sufficiently related to the
litigation to satisfy due process.
138. 311 Minn. -, 272 N.W.2d at 892.
139. Id.
140. Id. at - 272 N.W.2d at 893. For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, see Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L.
REv. 909, 1008-13 (1960); Stein, Jurisdictionby Attachment of Liability Insurance,
43 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1075, 1130-35 (1968).
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fend the requirements of due process. In view of our consistent policies of providing a forum to residents of this state
and extending our jurisdiction to the maximum limits consistent with due process, we decline to reverse our prior
decision.""
Again the defendants appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
D. Rush v. Savchuk
It should not have been difficult to foresee the course
taken by the United States Supreme Court in Rush v.
Savchuk.142 The Minnesota court had done little more than
pay lip service to the Shaffer requirement that jurisdictional
inquiries focus upon the relationship among the defendant,
the forum and the litigation. 14 3 Nowhere in its opinion had the
Minnesota court directly reviewed the insured's relation to
the forum or to the litigation. Instead, the court attempted to
satisfy the Shaffer requirement by considering the "defending
parties" as a single entity. The practical result of the court's
approach was the assertion of jurisdiction over the insured
based solely upon his insurer's activities.144 The Rush Court
held, however, that each defendant must meet International
Shoe's minimum contacts requirement. 145 The mere fact that
State Farm transacted business in Minnesota created no contacts between Rush and the forum, and clearly created no
basis for saying that the defendant had purposefully availed
himself of the privileges of conducting activities in Minnesota,
146
thus subjecting himself to its laws.
Similarly, there were no significant contacts between the

141. 311 Minn. at -,
272 N.W.2d at 893.
142. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
143. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204.
144. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 331-32.
145. Id. at 332.
146. Id. at 328-29. The language comes from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958). See note 33 supra. In Hanson, the United States Supreme Court found that
for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, "[ilt is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." Id. at 253 (emphasis added). In the companion case to
Rush, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Court also
relied heavily upon this language from Hanson.
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litigation and the forum.14 The subject of the litigation was
the alleged negligence of Rush and not the validity or construction of the insurance policy. Consequently, the policy obligations, deemed a garnishable debt by the Minnesota court,
established no tie between the litigation and the forum.14 8 The
fact that the policy may have been purchased precisely for
protection in the event of such litigation was of no
consequence.
The Supreme Court went on to analyze the legal fictions
underlying the Seider doctrine.
The legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for garnishment purposes, wherever the debtor is found is combined
with the legal fiction that a corporation is "present," for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it does business to yield the
conclusion that the obligation to defend and indemnify is
located in
the forum for purposes of the garnishment
9
statute.14
The Court found that this fictitious presence, without more,
did not establish a sufficient contact between the forum and
the insured.1 50
Finally, the Court held that the Seider doctrine was not
the equivalent of a direct action against an insurer.15 ' When
the Seider doctrine is applied, the forum's "ability to exert its
power over the [insured] is analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the case as a garnishee."'' 52 Therefore, if due
process forbids assertion of jurisdiction over the insured based
upon garnishment of the policy obligations, it also forbids
bringing the garnishee insurer into the action. 153
Justice Brennan dissented on the grounds that Interna147. 444 U.S. 329.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 328.
150. Id. at 329.
151. Id. at 330.
152. Id. at 330-31.
153. Id. at 331. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Rush, had a contrary opinion:
In this kind of case, the Minnesota statute authorizing jurisdiction is correctly characterized as the "functional equivalent" of a so-called direct-action
statute.... As so understood, it makes no difference whether the insurance
company is sued in its own name or, as Minnesota law provides, in the guise of
a suit against the individual defendant.
Id. at 333-34.
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tional Shoe did not rely on a mechanical contacts test.""
"Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."1"' The existence of
contacts between the defendant and the forum, therefore, is
simply one way of determining fairness and reasonableness. 56
Other considerations include the interests of the forum state,
the interests of other parties, and the actual burden placed on
the defendant.1 57 Due process, contended Justice Brennan, did
not require that the trial be held in the forum with which the
defendant had the "best contacts."1 8
Based upon the foregoing factors, Justice Brennan found
that Minnesota had an overriding interest in regulating insurance companies in the state and in providing a forum forits
residents.15 9 However, as the majority pointed out, there was
nothing truly regulatory about the Rush action; State Farm
Insurance Company had done nothing wrong. Neither the
conduct of State Farm's business nor the interpretation or
construction of the policy it had issued were in question.1, 0
Justice Brennan also found that the financial burdens
placed upon the defendant in Rush were relatively slight compared to those the plaintiff might face if forced to suit in another forum. 161 However, this argument, that the party with

the most money should be required to carry the heavier
financial burden of the lawsuit, is simply unjust. Moreover,
Justice Brennan's view fails to recognize that not only the defendant, but also the witnesses, the treating physicians, the
investigating police officers and much of the evidence surrounding the accident were located in Indiana. The substantial financial and practical burdens involved in litigating such
a claim in a foreign forum would appear to outweigh any ex154. Justice Brennan dissenting in the companion case, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
155. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.
156. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 300.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 301.
159. Id. at 302.
160. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 329.
161. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 303-04.
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pense the plaintiff might incur if he selected Indiana counsel,
and thus was forced1 to
travel to Indiana once for a deposition
2
and again for trial.
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that by purchasing an insurance policy from a national company like State Farm,
Rush had availed himself of benefits he might receive by reason of State Farm having an office and agent in Minnesota.
One such benefit was State Farm's ability to commence and
conduct an action, on behalf of Rush, in Minnesota against a
Minnesota resident.6 3 This, however, is no real benefit. Any
insurance company, national or otherwise, may commence an
action in the forum where the defendant resides. The only
real benefits of which Rush may have purposefully availed
himself in selecting a national company were lower premiums
and better coverage than perhaps were available from a
smaller company.
In its conclusion, the Supreme Court aptly focused upon
the underlying fallacy of the Seider doctrine.
The justifications offered in support of Seider jurisdiction share a common characteristic: they shift the focus of
the inquiry from the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation to that among the plaintiff, the forum, the insurer, and the litigation. The insurer's contacts
with the forum are attributed to the defendant because the
policy was taken out in anticipation of such litigation. The
State's interests in providing a forum for its residents and in
regulating the activities of insurance companies are substituted for its contacts with the defendant and the cause of
action.... In other words, the plaintiff's contacts with the
forum are decisive in determining whether the defendant's
due process rights are violated.'"
Such an approach, the Court concluded, was forbidden by
162. If the claim were litigated in Minnesota, either all the witnesses would have
to travel to Minnesota for their depositions and for trial, or all the Minnesota counsel
would have to travel to Indiana for depositions. In addition, one may assume that the
plaintiff's attorney would make at least one trip to Indiana to view the scene of the
accident and the vehicles involved. He might even wish to have an expert-presumably a Minnesota expert with whom he is familiar-travel to Indiana to
view the accident scene and the vehicles. These expenses clearly outweigh any expenses the plaintiff might incur if he sued in Indiana.
163. Id. at 304.
164. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 332.
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InternationalShoe and its progeny.

III.

THE AFTERMATH OF

Rush

The immediate effect of Rush appears clear: the Seider
doctrine is finally dead.1 65 This may be viewed by some as a
giant step backward in the jurisprudential march toward a
"realistic" approach to state court jurisdiction. However, the
Rush decision is actually a logical extension of International
Shoe, Shaffer, and the minimum contacts, due process standard. This conclusion may be difficult for some to accept, primarily because the minimum contacts test, often praised for
its expansion of in personam jurisdiction, was employed in
Rush to constrict the scope of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. Supporters of the "realistic" approach are thus faced
with the realization that their arch enemy, Pennoyer, was
really an ally with respect to its broad, albeit rigid, application of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.1 16
A second, less obvious, result of the Rush decision, may be
its effect on direct action statutes. The Seider doctrine was, in
many respects, the functional equivalent of a direct action
statute."'7 The only differences were that (1) it was created by
judicial decree rather than by legislative enactment, and (2) it
voided any "no action" clause in the policy and thus made the
insurer joinable as a defendant. The question created by Rush
therefore is whether a statute which authorized a direct action
against an insurer in a Seider-type situation is constitutional.
It should be noted from the outset that the constitutionality of direct action statutes should not depend upon any distinction between judicial acts and legislative acts. 8 The Wis165. Insofar as the Court in Rush neither discussed nor relied upon the fact that
Rush became a Minnesota resident after the accident, any subsequent attempt to
distinguish Rush on such a basis would be unpersuasive. Such an argument was made
prior to Rush in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d at 199 n.6, and in the
dissents in Savchuk 1, 309 Minn. at -,
245 N.W.2d at 633, and in Savchuk II, 311
Minn. at _ 272 N.W.2d at 895.
166. See generally Comment, Jurisdiction in Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725.
167. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text, supra.
168. At least one author has found the tests for determining legislative and judicial jurisdiction to be similar but not identical. The Constitutionality of Seider v.
Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 409 (1978).
In assessing both judicial and legislative jurisdictiojp, a court will inquire into
the contacts between the state and the occurrence sought to be governed by
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consin Supreme Court, for instance, has held that when the
elements of the Wisconsin long-arm statute are met, the requirements of due process are also satisfied. '6 9 The statute is
simply a codification of case law and therefore serves as a
"legislative pronouncement" that due process has been satisfied.170 The Wisconsin court has also recognized that while the

legislature may constrict the exercise of jurisdiction, it cannot
expand jurisdiction beyond the constitutional limits of due
process. 71 Thus, the satisfaction of the statutory elements is
not conclusive proof that due process is satisfied; a defendant
always maintains the right to rebut the statutory presumption
of constitutionality.17 2 The fact that jurisdiction is defined, by
a legislative act, therefore, has no effect on the minimum conthe state and determine whether those contacts are sufficient to render "reasonable" the state's exertion of power, be it judicial or legislative, over that
occurrence. The emphasis, however, can be markedly different. With respect to
legislative jurisdiction, the inquiry will often center on whether the state has a
reasonable regulatory interest in the occurrence and whether the public policy
expressed by its rule can be advanced by application of its rule. With respect
to judicial jurisdiction, the focus has traditionally been on fairness to the defendant to protect him from oppression by the plaintiff, who normally controls
choice of forum.
Id. at 414 n.36 (citations omitted). This rationale is based on an overly technical
reading of Shaffer, Hanson and Watson. However, according to Shaffer, the focal
point must always be on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation. Therefore, regardless of whether the basis for jurisdiction arises from a
legislative act or a judicial decree, the court must view the state's regulatory interest
and the burdens placed on the defendant. The "emphasis" should not be different.
This interpretation is best exemplified by Rush itself, where the Court systematically
dealt first with the defendant's contacts with the forum, 444 U.S. at 327-28, and then
with the forum's interest in the litigation. Id. at 329. See Comment, Long-Arm and
Quasi in Rem Jurisdictionand the Fundamental Test of Fairness,69 MICH. L. Rv.
300, 336-37 (1970).
169. Wisconsin, in Zerbel v. H. L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872
(1970), adopted an analytical framework for determining personal jurisdiction. This
framework included a separate analysis for determining whether the jurisdictional
contacts, which satisfied the statute, were also sufficient to satisfy due process. This
additional analysis was later found to be unnecessary, if the statutory elements were
satisfied. Afram v. Balfour Machine, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 702, 713, 218 N.W.2d 288, 294
(1974), followed in Fields v. Playboy Club of Lake Geneva, Inc., 75 Wis. 2d 644, 654,
250 N.W.2d 311, 316 (1977).
170. Fields v. Playboy Club of Lake Geneva, Inc., 75 Wis. 2d at 654, 250 N.W.2d
at 316.
171. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L. REv. 909 (1960).
172. Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 562, 577, 235 N.W.2d 446,
454 (1975). Rebuttal is effected through the use of Zerbel's due process analysis.
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tacts, due process standard formulated in International
Shoe. 173 However, direct action statutes are set apart from the

Seider doctrine insofar as such statutes declare void any "no
action" clause in the policy and thereby subject the insurer to
joinder as a party defendant.
As observed by the Court in Rush, jurisdiction over the
insured was a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over
the insurer. 174 Because the insurer was not a named defen-

dant, its contacts with the forum were irrelevant in establishing jurisdiction. 175 However, if the "no action" clause were

voided by means of a direct action statute, the insurer's contacts with the forum state would become highly relevant in
determining the court's jurisdiction and would render the exercise of jurisdiction over the insurer constitutionally acceptable. 17 6 The remaining question, therefore, is whether a state
can make an insurer directly liable for an insured tortfeasor's
acts by simply enacting a direct action statute. Clearly, a direct action statute, in order to pass constitutional muster,
would have to satisfy the requirements of due process. But
what standard is to be used to test the validity of the statute:
the minimum contacts test developed through International
Shoe and its progeny, the legitimate governmental interest
test articulated in Watson, or both?
In the Watson case, the issue was whether the forum state
could hold an insurer directly liable for the acts of its insured,
by means of a direct action statute, despite the existence of a
"no action" clause in the policy.1 77 The issue was not whether

the forum could properly exercise jurisdiction over the insurer. Had jurisdiction been the issue, the Court would presumably have applied the minimum contacts standard created
nine years earlier in International Shoe. Watson, therefore,
suggests that both due process tests are involved in evaluating
173. See generally Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 Revision Notes-1959 (West). See
also Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental
Test of Fairness,69 MCH. L. Rv. 300 (1970), for an expansive listing (3 pages) of
articles written on long-arm statutes and quasi in rem jurisdiction, at 300 n.3.
174. 444 U.S. at 330-31.
175. Id.
176. The Court noted that the insurer's contacts with the forum would support
the forum's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the insurer "even for an unrelated cause of action." Id. at 330.
177. See notes 52-58 and accompanying text, supra.

19801

CIVIL PROCEDURE

a direct action statute. First, Watson's legitimate governmental interest test must be applied to determine whether the insurer may be held directly liable for its insured's acts in the
face of a "no action" clause and therefore made a party defendant. Second, International Shoe's minimum contacts test
must be applied to determine whether the forum may properly exercise jurisdiction over the insurer once it has been
made a party.
In applying these two tests to a statute authorizing direct
actions in Seider-type situations, several problems arise. First,
Watson did not discuss all the legitimate interests a forum
might have to support the creation of a direct action statute.
It is not entirely clear, therefore, whether a state would have
sufficient legitimate interests in Seider-type situations to enact such a direct action statute.' In this regard, the second
line of argument, discussed above,7 is helpful in evaluating
the pros and cons of such a statute.
According to the proponents of the argument,'8 0 the same
considerations stated in Watson to sustain Louisiana's direct
action statute would apply to a direct action statute covering
Seider-type situations. The forum has a legitimate interest in
protecting the rights of its residents wherever they are injured, especially in view of the fact that the forum may subsequently be required to provide medical care and/or disability
coverage for its injured residents."' In addition, the defen-

178. Some commentators are unsure as to whether a direct action statute may
only apply to accidents within the forum: See Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of
Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1075, 1100-04 (1968); Comment, Garnishment
of Intangibles:Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation,67 COLUM. L.
REv. 550, 559 (1967); Note, Quasi in Rem JurisdictionBased on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, 655 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300, 336
(1970). Other commentators believe that a direct action statute could constitutionally
allow Seider-type situations: Zammitt, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HAsTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 15, 21 (1978); Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-Judgment
Attachment, JurisdictionBased on Property,and New York's Seider Doctrine:Have
We Finally Given Up the Ghost of the Res? 27 But'ALo L. Rav. 323, 354-57 (1978);
Comment, Quasi In Rem on the Heels of Shaffer v. Heitner. If International Shoe
Fits, 46 FORDHAm L. REv. 459, 485 (1977); Jurisdiction-QuasiIn Rem: Seider v.
Roth to Turner v. Evers-Wrong Means to the Right End, 11 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 504
(1974).
179. See note 51 and accompanying text, supra.
180. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text, supra.
181. The Supreme Court has found these considerations to be very relevant in
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dant insurer has a real interest in avoiding liability under the
policy and therefore conducts the defense, hires the attorneys,
and controls settlement. The forum, in turn, has a legitimate
interest in allowing the plaintiff to proceed directly against
the insurer. According to the opponents,"8 2 the forum does not
have a sufficient legitimate interest in the insurance relationship, created outside the forum between a nonresident
tortfeasor and the insurer, to make the insurer directly liable
on the basis of the insurance contract. In addition, Watson
required that the forum have a more direct relation to the accident giving rise to the litigation.
Thus, based upon Watson, it is at least arguable that a
state could constitutionally enact a direct action statute which
would make an insurer directly liable in Seider-type situations. The question still remains, however, whether the forum
would be able to exercise jurisdiction over this defendant
insurer. Here, International Shoe's minimum contacts test
applies.
Again there are two sides to this issue. On the one hand,
an argument can easily be made that, insofar as the insurer is
doing business in the forum and controls the litigation, it is
clearly subject to the forum's jurisdiction. 18 3 On the other
hand, insofar as Shaffer requires that the relation among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigationbe the focal point for
determining jurisdiction, 1 84 a direct action against the insurer

in Seider-type situations may be unconstitutional.
Assuming that the negligence of the insured is the sole issue in the lawsuit, the fact that the insurer does business in
the forum provides no contact which has a reasonable relation
to the litigation.185 Neither the defendant's business activities
in the forum, nor the provisions of its insurance policies are at
issue. Also, the forum has no reasonable relation to the litigation because the claim arose from an out-of-state accident
which involves the negligence of a nonresident tortfeasor who
determining which law a forum should apply. Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co., 380 U.S.
39 (1965).
182. See notes 61-62 & 67-69 and accompanying text, supra.
183. This argument was suggested by Rush itself, 444 U.S. at 330.
184. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204, followed in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at
327.
185. Compare with the Court's reasoning in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 329.
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has no contacts with the forum."" 6 This analysis rests upon
the belief that the plaintiff under a direct action statute, like
under Seider, is really pursuing the insurance policy res and
not the insurance company itself. The fact that the insurer
does business in the forum, therefore, remains completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action which has as its central issue the insured's negligence.
The above analysis reveals that a direct action statute covering Seider-type situations may be constitutional. In fact,
one court has already found it unnecessary to resort to the
legal fictions of the Seider doctrine. In Kirchen v. Orth,187 the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
held that, despite the inapplicability of Wisconsin's direct action statute,18 8 an action was maintainable against the
tortfeasor's insurer in a Seider-type situation. 89 In so finding,
the court noted the insurer's real interest in the litigation 90
and Wisconsin's interest in facilitating the recovery of its injured residents regardless of where the accident occurred. 1 91
Finally, in review of the Seider doctrine, the court concluded,
While the result and intent of the Seider court commends
itself to this court, we do not believe it necessary to resort to
legal fictions of "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction and the
problems inherent in doing indirectly that which ought to be
done directly. The same result is obtained without resorting
to additional legal fictions and ancient doctrines of quasi-inrem jurisdiction
by precluding the assertion of the no-action
192
clause.

IV. CONCLUSION

Rush v.Savchuk has thus ended the Seider doctrine and
186. Compare with the Court's reasoning in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 327-28.
See note 147 and accompanying text, supra.
187. Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
188. Wisconsin's direct action statute made the insurer a proper party defendant
only if (1) the policy were delivered or issued in the state, or (2) the accident, injury
or negligence occurred in the state. Wis. STAT. § 260.11(1) (1973).
189. 390 F. Supp. at 318. Due to the conduct of the insurer in negotiating a settlement with the plaintiff in Wisconsin, the court held that equity estopped the insurer
from asserting its no-action clause when it later found out that Wisconsin lacked
jurisdiction over the insured.
190. Id.

191. Id. at 319.
192. Id. at 320.
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its use of quasi in rem jurisdiction to proceed directly against
a tortfeasor's insurer. However, it remains to be seen whether
a state can exercise jurisdiction in Seider-type situations
through the enactment of a direct action statute.19 3 The possibility that such a statute might be permissible reveals that the
legitimate governmental interest test of Watson needs to be
re-evaluated and better coordinated with InternationalShoe's
minimum contacts test. Clearly, traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice are offended when the standard of
due process is applied to two identical factual situations, but
produces two distinct results simply because in one situation
the tortfeasor is the named defendant, and in the other, the
tortfeasor's insurer is the named defendant.
JOHN

R.
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - Articles 3 and 4
- Bank Required to Disburse Funds After Final Payment. Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Midland
National Bank, 96 Wis. 2d 155, 292 N.W.2d 591 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The check collection procedure,1 followed by banks in Wisconsin, is controlled by Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 2 which applies to items in the course of bank collec193. See Rosenberg, One ProceduralGenie Too Many OR Putting Seider Back
Into Its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 660 (1971), where the author discusses a proposed
direct action statute for New York which has since been rejected.

1. For a detailed description of the check collection process, see Leary, Check
Handling under Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 331
(1965); and, Malcolm, How Bank Collection Works - Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How. L. J. 71 (1965).
2. Wis. STAT. §§ 404.101 to 404.504 (1971). Wis. STAT. §§ 404.101 to 404.504, and
§3 403.101 to 403.806, correspond to Uniform Commercial Code §§ 4-101 to 4-504,

and 3-101 to 3-806, respectively. Hereinafter, citations will be made to the U.C.C.
section. Note, however, that the requirements of Article 4 may be superseded or
modified by agreement, Federal Reserve Regulations, or clearinghouse rules. U.C.C.
§ 4-103.
3. U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(g) defines "item" as "any instrument for payment of money
even though it is not negotiable but does not include money."

